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I. The Issues Swirling Around before Rita
As every judge who has not been living in a cave for the
last seven years knows, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have
thrown federal sentencing into a tizzy. The Sixth Amend-
ment, a bare majority of the Supreme Court insists,
requires federal indictments to charge and prosecutors to
prove to juries every fact legally required to authorize a
particular punishment. In other words, if a fact raises a
statutory or binding guidelines maximum sentence, prose-
cutors must prove that fact to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The only exceptions are for defendants who have
admitted facts, say as part of a guilty plea, and for facts
that relate to recidivism.
Of course, in Booker the remedial majority—consisting
of the Apprendi/Blakely dissenters plus Justice Ginsburg—
solved the Apprendi problem in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines not by submitting a plethora of guidelines facts
to juries but by striking down the Guidelines’ binding
force, rendering them advisory. This remedy seemed star-
tling, in part, because it knocked out one of the key pillars
of the Guidelines—its effort to bind sentencing judges
within a fairly narrow range to ensure consistency and
uniformity—while leaving the rest supposedly intact. Yet it
left judges, rather than juries, with the power to determine
countless guidelines facts. For a line of cases that pur-
ported to increase juries’ power against judicial
encroachment, it seemed bizarre that the ultimate remedy
was simply to return more discretion to judges.
Booker raised more problems than it solved. What
would appellate review of compliance with no-longer-
mandatory guidelines mean? What would the standard of
review be? Could appellate courts privilege or defer to sen-
tences within the Guidelines range computed by judges
without violating the Sixth Amendment? Could they scru-
tinize out-of-range sentences more closely consistently
with the Sixth Amendment? How much weight could the
Guidelines retain without crossing some ill-defined
boundary between true guidelines and impermissible
laws?
This past Term, the Supreme Court was to consider
two companion cases on the appropriate appellate review
of within-range and below-range Guidelines sentences.
Claiborne v. United States presented the issue of how appel-
late courts should review sentences outside the Guidelines
ranges. Unfortunately, while his case was pending, Mario
Claiborne chased a stolen pickup truck and was shot and
killed in the ensuing firefight, requiring the Court to dis-
miss his case as moot. The Court will return to the
strength of the justification needed to sustain a beyond-
Guidelines sentence in United States v. Gall this Term.
The Court did, however, decide Rita v. United States1
while Mr. Rita remained in fair health. Rita, convicted of
making false statements under oath before a grand jury,
sought a sentence below the thirty-three-to-forty-one-
month Guidelines range because of his physical
condition, likely vulnerability in prison, and military
experience. The trial judge declined to depart or deviate
downward and sentenced him to thirty-three months,
the bottom of the range. The Fourth Circuit, applying a
presumption of reasonableness because the sentence
was within the properly calculated Guidelines range,
affirmed. The question presented to the Court was
whether an appellate court may presume a within-
Guidelines sentence to be reasonable.
Several paths were open to the Court. It could have
been purist about the Sixth Amendment, declaring that
giving any weight to minima and maxima that depend on
facts found by judges would violate the Sixth Amendment.
This is the path that Justices Scalia and Thomas advocated
in their separate concurrence in the judgment, which
verged on a dissent. It could have wrung its hands about
the due process unfairness of propping up a judge-run
system and encouraging judges to keep sentencing as they
did in the bad old mandatory-Guidelines days. This was
the lonely, unheeded call of Justice Souter’s dissent. Or it
could have embraced the presumptive reasonableness of
within-Guidelines sentences and the presumptive unrea-
sonableness of beyond-Guideline sentences, with little
more than a nod toward the marginally greater flexibility
judges should enjoy today. The Court, however, did not
choose any of these paths or anything so clear-cut.
II. The Rita Straddle
Rita did answer the question presented, but in a bizarrely
narrow way. The Court held that a circuit court may apply a
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within the Guidelines. It did not hold that a circuit court
must or should apply this presumption, leaving open the
door to the very disuniformity of lower-court practices that
the Sentencing Reform Act was designed to counteract. (In
practice, though, all circuits strongly presume that within-
Guidelines sentences are reasonable even if they do not say
that is what they are doing. That is why it took more than
two and a half years after Booker for a reported within-
Guidelines sentence to be reversed on appeal as
substantively unreasonable.2)
The Court also left observers in a bit of a fog about
exactly what this presumption of reasonableness is. We
know much more about what it is not. It is not binding.3 It
does not put a burden on one party or the other to prove or
disprove a fact or else lose a case. Nor is it as strong as
Chevron-type deference to agencies. Nor is it a trial court
presumption that the Guidelines sentence is correct. On
the contrary, the Court disavowed any trial-court presump-
tion in favor of the Guidelines: “In determining the merits
of [the parties’ arguments about whether to sentence
within the Guidelines range], the sentencing court does
not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply.”4 All that we know
about the presumption of reasonableness is that, in apply-
ing it, an appellate court is asking whether the trial court
abused its discretion.5
As Professor Kate Stith of Yale Law School has noted,
this is the fifth time that Justice Breyer has given basically
the same set of instructions to appellate courts: where pos-
sible, defer to the Commission and the District Court by
affirming within-Guidelines sentences; where that is not
possible, defer to the sentencing judge who offers a good
reason for a different sentence, by affirming reasonable
non-Guidelines sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act,
Part I of the original Guidelines, Koon, the Booker reme-
dial majority opinion, and now Rita repeat these
instructions. Professor Stith predicts that once again
courts of appeals will hear the first part of this message
but not the second part.6 Judges have likewise observed
that the presumption of reasonableness was rebuttable
more in theory than in practice.7 But Rita aims to change
that. A more sanguine reader would predict that the pre-
sumption of reasonableness is couched carefully enough
to inject more needed flexibility into the system, without
destroying it, if lower courts listen and take Rita’s reason-
ing seriously. And Justice Stevens goes out of his way to
allay this concern, as I will discuss shortly.
Why allow this presumption? Justice Breyer’s opinion
for the Court has a four-page hymn to the beauty and
rationality of the Guidelines, which embody the expertise
and wisdom of the Commission’s judgment in imple-
menting the statutory objectives and purposes of
punishment. (Justice Breyer is about the only person who
still writes full-throated hymns to the Guidelines any-
more.) They filter the statutory purposes and translate
them into practice. When a district judge imposes a sen-
tence within the Guidelines range, the Court reasoned, his
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judgment confirms the Commission’s judgment that the
Guidelines sentence fits this typical case and is probably
reasonable.8
The Court rejected Justice Scalia and Thomas’s objec-
tion that the Sixth Amendment forbids sentence increases
that take into account facts found by judges rather than
juries.9 A nonbinding appellate presumption, the Court
reasoned, does not require or forbid a higher sentence, dif-
ferentiating Rita from Blakely and Booker. In other words,
the Sixth Amendment appears to forbid judicial findings
of facts that trigger or unlock binding maxima but not of
those facts that judges weigh and factor into a complex,
reasoned judgment. Apparently, the Apprendi train goes
this far and no further. As a matter of pure abstract logic,
Justices Scalia and Thomas have a point: either way, the
defendant spends extra years in prison without the safe-
guards of jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But
the majority of the Court is being far more practical and
respectful of nuanced, contextual judicial findings, of the
sort that have long been buried in judges’ indeterminate
sentencing decisions. Practicality trumps theoretical
purity.
The Court also rejected Justice Souter’s fear in dissent
that the presumption of reasonableness will create a safe
harbor that district judges find irresistible, in his words
exerting “substantial gravitational pull” back toward the
Guidelines.10 The majority’s response was to disavow the
negative implication of its holding. “The fact that we per-
mit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of
reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a
presumption of unreasonableness. Even the Government
concedes that appellate courts may not presume that every
variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable.”11
Justice Stevens’s concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
was even more emphatic in denying that the Guidelines’
pull is inexorable. “Our decision today makes clear, how-
ever, that the rebuttability of the presumption is real. It
should also be clear that appellate courts must review sen-
tences individually and deferentially whether they are
inside the Guidelines range . . . or outside that range. . . .
[T]he Guidelines are [now] truly advisory.”12
Probably the most interesting and least controversial
aspect of Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court is Part III,
where he discussed at length the procedures that a district
judge should follow in imposing sentence. The key is a
reasoned, articulable judgment. Of course a sentencing
judge need not always issue a full opinion, particularly
where the case is simple and uncontested. But “[t]he sen-
tencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ argu-
ments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own
legal decision-making authority.”13 In some circum-
stances, the judge can simply rest on the Commission’s
own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is appropriate
for the typical case and that this case is typical. But where
either party presents a nonfrivolous argument for a differ-
ent sentence, “the judge will normally go further and
explain why he has rejected those arguments.”14 The
adversarial clash of opposing arguments should illumine
the judge’s reasoning and call for his response.
Circuit courts had already begun to develop a jurispru-
dence of procedural and substantive reasonableness, and
Rita will probably foster this development. For example,
the Tenth Circuit already required Rule 32(h) advance
notice before a district judge departed or varied from the
Guidelines, as well as detailed analysis of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) statutory factors that support a proposed
variance.15 Although some judges disagree with these pro-
cedural hoops, Rita endorses at least a modest amount of
this review.
The judge who sentenced Rita listened to each of the
parties’ arguments, considered the supporting evidence,
and then simply found the circumstances insufficient and
found the thirty-three-month sentence “appropriate.” He
could have said more, noting explicitly that he had heard
and considered the evidence and argument, that he thought
the Commission’s Guideline sentence was appropriate in
the typical case, and that Rita’s personal circumstances were
simply not different enough from the typical case to warrant
a different sentence. But the law does not require a sentenc-
ing judge to write more than he did.16
III. The (Controlling?) Concurrence
Three of the Apprendi five disagreed with the majority. As
mentioned earlier, Justices Scalia and Thomas’s concur-
rence in the judgment advocated denying any substantive
weight to any judge-found fact at sentencing, leaving
appellate courts only to police the procedures by which
sentencing judges reach their conclusions.17 And Justice
Souter’s dissent wrung its hands about the unfairness of
allowing the Guidelines to retain their strong “gravita-
tional pull,” in his words.18 But Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg defected to form the fifth and sixth votes for the
majority. They joined Justice Breyer’s opinion in full, mak-
ing it the law of the land. But at the same time, they both
signed Justice Stevens’s concurrence, which has a notably
different tenor. The outcome resembles some of Justice
O’Connor’s famous moments, when her concurrence
would amplify and qualify her deciding vote, leading some
lower courts to treat her solo musings as the law of the
land. It remains to be seen how much weight lower courts
will give to the opinion of the Court and how much they
will qualify it in light of Justice Stevens’s spin.
Justice Stevens accepted the Booker remedial majority
opinion as the law of the land despite his previous dissent
from it. He laid more stress on appellate deference “to the
sentencing judge’s individualized sentencing determina-
tion.”19 Yet he recognized that Booker’s remedial holding
contemplates substantive and not merely procedural
appellate review.20 As for Justice Scalia’s parade of horrible
sentencing hypotheticals, he sensibly responded that we
need not worry about those problems until we get there.21
Ironically, while Booker invalidated the Guidelines across
the board and not just in those cases raising enhancement
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issues, Rita treats any Sixth Amendment concerns as
issues to be raised in as-applied challenges to sentences
that depend on enhancements based on facts found by
judges.22 It is hard to say what these as-applied challenges
might look like or in what kinds of cases they might suc-
ceed, because neither the majority nor Justice Stevens’s
concurrence discussed the meat of substantive reasonable-
ness review and its relationship to facts found by a jury or
admitted by a defendant.
The balance of power in the Apprendi cases now seems
to rest with Justices Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s practical
concerns rather than any effort to return to an idealized
eighteenth-century Sixth Amendment without judicial
sentencing discretion. To the extent one can hazard a
guess, this development suggests that the era of major
sentencing upheavals has ended, and we are now in the
realm of less ambitious tinkering to make sentencing
moderately more procedurally and substantively fair.
IV. Questions Left Open by Rita
Rita does not change much, at least in the short term; at
most it nudges judges inclined to depart toward moder-
ately more flexibility in applying the Guidelines, while
affirming a safe harbor for those inclined to cruise close to
shore. The result may be moderately less consistency,
more disparity, and more individualization. Already, a few
district courts, relying on Rita, are beginning to refer
explicitly to the statutory purposes and justifications for
punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and what punish-
ment will achieve in the individual case, in addition to
crunching the usual Guidelines calculations.23 But Rita
contains hints about the future of the Guidelines that may
portend bigger changes.
First, the Court and especially Justice Stevens’s concur-
rence insisted that the presumption of reasonableness is
truly rebuttable. That suggests that at least some within-
Guidelines sentences are unreasonable, and conversely
that outside-Guidelines sentences are reasonable for those
cases.
Now, the Court could mean one of two things by that.
First, it could mean that the Guidelines are probably rea-
sonable for the mine-run of cases within each crime or
category, to use the Court’s phrase, but there will be some
individual defendants and circumstances that make a
Guidelines sentence unreasonable in that particular case.
It seems pretty clear that the Court’s presumption of rea-
sonableness is meant to be genuinely rebuttable at least
for these specific cases. To use Judge McConnell’s termi-
nology, these are as-applied challenges; an example is the
argument that a particular defendant is atypical for the
class of career criminals.24 Second, the Court could also go
further and suggest that the Guidelines themselves lead to
unreasonable sentences in certain recurring categories of
cases. These facial challenges, to use Judge McConnell’s
term, attack head-on the sentencing policy underlying a
particular guideline, such as the crack/powder cocaine dis-
parity.25 This latter substantive policy disagreement, on the
one hand, seems to fit within a broad, contextual assess-
ment of reasonableness but, on the other hand, could
undermine sentencing consistency and predictability and
deference to legislative judgment. The Tenth Circuit has
suggested that the Guidelines themselves enjoy demo-
cratic legitimacy because they reflect “popular political
will,”26 which would make facial challenges especially
troubling, but I question how democratic and responsive
the Sentencing Commission really is. Surprisingly, Rita
appears to empower district judges to second-guess these
policy choices, which weakens the Guidelines’ emphasis
on uniformity across judges. District judges can now
entertain arguments “that the Guidelines reflect an
unsound judgment, or, for example, that they do not gen-
erally treat certain defendant characteristics in the proper
way.”27 Though some lower courts are still resisting the
implication of this language,28 the Solicitor General’s brief
in the pending Gall case concedes that district courts may
vary from the Guidelines based in part on policy disagree-
ments with the Guidelines.29 This approach could lead to
a strange disparity of different precedents in different dis-
tricts and circuits, unless the Court envisions allowing
appellate case law to substitute for or amend Sentencing
Commission policy. Only time will tell whether five mem-
bers of the Court agree.
Review of outside-Guidelines sentences is likely to be
most contentious in drug cases, where many judges dis-
agree with the severity of the Guidelines. Moreover, the
Sentencing Commission itself has unsuccessfully sought
to reduce the disparity in sentences between crack and
powder cocaine, contradicting its own Guidelines and
weakening any suggestion that the cocaine Guidelines
embody the Commission’s sober expertise, reflection, and
final judgment. Keep an eye on two cases that the Court
will decide this Term: In Gall v. United States, the district
court imposed probation rather than thirty months’
imprisonment on an ecstasy dealer based on his youth,
immaturity, lack of criminal history, support of friends
and family, withdrawal from the conspiracy, and post-
offense rehabilitation.30 The Court will consider whether
“the strength of the justification needed to sustain an out-
side-Guidelines sentence varies in proportion to the
degree of the variance.”31 Kimbrough v. United States, also
to be decided this Term, will address whether a district
court may depart downward from the Guidelines sentence
for crack cocaine based on its disagreement with the dis-
parity between crack and powder cocaine sentences.32
The crack cocaine issue exemplifies a broader concern.
Rita speaks only to the situation where both the Sentenc-
ing Commission and the district judge agree that the
within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Appellate courts
may defer to this agreement. Kimbrough is an example
where neither the Commission nor the district judge
agrees that the within-Guidelines sentence is appropriate.
There will be other such situations, where for example the
district judge stresses a factor that the Commission over-
looked or to which it gave less weight. Rita simply does
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not address whether or how much to defer to the Commis-
sion or district judge in these situations.
It is also worth considering what will become of Rita’s
procedural requirements. Rita suggests that Guidelines
calculations, departures, variances, and Rule 32(h)
advance notice remain alive and well as procedural com-
ponents of adversarial decision making, though some
circuits had earlier questioned the continuing relevance of
these procedures. District judges should continue to use
correct Guidelines calculations as anchors and starting
points for their analysis, as these computations generally
embody the Commission’s expertise and reasoned judg-
ment. District judges who decide to depart or vary from
the Guidelines sentence probably need to offer more writ-
ten justification than those who stay closer to the
Guidelines’ safe(r) harbor, but that was the case in practice
anyway. My hope is that the renewed emphasis on serving
the statutory purposes of punishment will lead to sentenc-
ing decisions that not only articulate the Guidelines
mathematics but also offer some plain-English explana-
tions of how much retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
restitution, et cetera are needed in particular cases and
why. The Guidelines ranges are important and weighty
starting points, and beginning with these calculations
helps to promote uniformity and consistency, but Rita
suggests that they are starting points and not necessarily
ending ones. Statements of reasons improve the sentenc-
ing process and help the defendant, victim, and public to
understand it and respect its legitimacy. As Rita notes,
“[b]y articulating reasons, even if brief, the sentencing
judge not only assures reviewing courts (and the public)
that the sentencing process is a reasoned process but also
helps that process evolve.”33 One must not read too much
into this statement, though, as the district judge in Rita
itself did not give much in the way of reasons.
At this point my crystal ball peters out. Second-guess-
ing the direction of the Court is always hazardous, even
more so when the Court’s coalitions are so fragmentary,
shifting, and motivated by varying concerns. On the
whole, though, Rita portends moderate improvement and
moderately more flexibility in the status quo, more proce-
dural review and substantive deference by appellate
courts, and the preservation of Guidelines systems that
carry some weight so long as they do not harden into bind-
ing rules. Gall and Kimbrough will tell much more, in
particular how much wiggle room district courts have to
depart or vary downward in drug cases.
V. What about the Sixth Amendment?
What is most puzzling about Rita is the dog that did not
bark, namely the Sixth Amendment. Justices Scalia and
Thomas seem driven by an extreme vision of the Sixth
Amendment, but none of the other Justices truly engaged
their argument, let alone offered a competing understand-
ing of what the Sixth Amendment requires. (The original
Apprendi coalition comprised these two Sixth Amendment
purists and three other Justices who were driven more by
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due process concerns about fairness to defendants; now
that coalition has splintered.) Amid all the discussion of
the Sentencing Commission, Congress, district judges,
and appellate review, somehow juries are noticeably
absent. Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker upset structured-sen-
tencing law in the name of protecting the jury’s historic
role, but oddly the remedy has been to give district judges
more leeway rather than returning sentencing power to
juries. The objection to sentencing rules has morphed
from a Sixth Amendment need to protect juries’ sacred
role to a flexible due process assurance that someone in
the system has the power to tailor sentences to an individ-
ual defendant’s crime and characteristics.
In the end, then, this line of cases has judicially revised
the Sentencing Guidelines to create more flexibility, along
the lines that many commentators and judges had been
suggesting for years. These revisions may perhaps be wise
as a matter of policy. But what these changes have to do with
the Constitution, how the Supreme Court can force these
changes upon state systems that never suffered from the
pathologies of the Federal Guidelines, the Court cannot say. 
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